Maintenance Report - HP BBC HCDPP

Issue: 1.0, 2020-jan-16

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1 Introduction

On 12 December 2019, a Maintenance Impact Analysis Report [MIAR11] was submitted to CSEC, as part of a request from HP Inc. to extend the validity of the Common Criteria certificate previously awarded to:

- HP PageWide Enterprise Color MFP 780 / 785
- HP PageWide Managed Color MFP E77650 / E77660
- HP LaserJet Managed MFP E52545
- HP Color Laser MFP E57540.

The process to achieve this under mutual recognition is described in “Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements” [AC]. In accordance with [AC], the [MIAR11] describes all changes done to the TOE and/or its IT environment, all resulting changes done to the evaluation evidence, and the security impact of the changes.

The process of extending the validity of a certificate to an updated product is referred to below as “certificate maintenance”.

It should be noted that the assessment of the certification body skipped a few formal steps (related to project planning) and went directly from review of the maintenance application to finalising the maintenance report.

This does not follow CSEC’s written procedures, but for such a simple project the need for planning is small. This approach was chosen in agreement between the certifiers and the operations manager.
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<th>Previously Certified TOE</th>
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2 Description of Changes

The changed made to the TOE has been subject to the following changes:

1. The previously evaluated product includes a Seagate ST500LT015 self-encrypting drive (SED) that is FIPS 140-2 validated (CMVP #1826), but the validation reached its scheduled sunset date in September 2019. The disk therefore has now been replaced with a Common Criteria certified (VID10857) and FIPS 140-2 validated (CMVP #3252) self-encrypting disk drive (SED), Seagate ST500LM033.

In the evaluation, the self-encrypting drive is covered by an SFR, FDP_DSK_EXT.1, which requires that the SED has been CC certified/validated against the Full Disk Encryption Protection Profile. In the [HCDPP] assurance activity description for TSS, it is stated that the cryptographic functions (i.e. the security mechanisms corresponding to the SFR) are provided by the operational environment. Therefore, the change should be categorized as minor, following the guidelines in [AC].

2.1 Affected evaluation evidence

The affected evaluation evidence is:

1. The Security Target
2. Key Management Description
3. The Administrative Guidance
4. Additional test documentation

The changes in (1-3) were made to change the information specific to the SED and its validations. The additional test documentation (4) shows that the new SED initialization works and results in the intended operational state.

The TOE hardware and firmware is unchanged.

2.2 Conclusion

The changes done to the TOE has not in any way changed the hardware or firmware of the TOE, only the Security Target, the Key Management Description, and the Administrative Guidance were updated with the name and validation information for the new SED, and test evidence showing that the new SED works as intended were added.

The changes apply to functionality located in the operational environment, and are therefore categorized as minor, so that certificate maintenance according [AC] applies.

The conclusion is that the assurance gained during the original evaluation and certification for

HP PageWide Enterprise Color MFP 780 / 785
HP PageWide Managed Color MFP E77650 / E77660
HP LaserJet Managed MFP E52545
HP Color Laser MFP E57540,

remains after changing the self-encryption drive delivered with the product.
3 References

MIAR11  Maintenance Impact Analysis Report, HP PageWide Enterprise Color MFP 780 / 785
HP PageWide Managed Color MFP E77650 / E77660
HP LaserJet Managed MFP E52545

TEST BBC_HCDPP_New_HDD_Configuration Pages,
FMV ID 19FMV7126-3.

STnew HP PageWide Enterprise Color MFP 780 / 785,
HP PageWide Managed Color MFP E77650 / E77660,
HP LaserJet Managed MFP E52545,
HP Color Laser MFP E57540
Security Target, HP Inc., 2019-11-25, 1.6,
FMV ID 19FMV7126-5.

STcert HP PageWide Enterprise Color MFP 780 / 785,
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HP LaserJet Managed MFP E52545,
HP Color Laser MFP E57540
Security Target, HP Inc., 2019-04-16, 1.5,
FMV ID 18FMV4123-23.

CRcert Certification Report, HP BBC HCDPP, FMV/CSEC, 2019-05-06,
document version 1.0, FMV ID 18FMV4123-16:1.

AC Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, 2012-06, document version 2.1

HCDPP Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, IPA/NIAP/MFP TC,
2015-09-10, document version 1.0

ERRATA Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata#1
June 2017, IPA/NIAP/HCD TC, 2017-06-27